The Case for Legalizing Insider Trading
Securities Regulation ·
Every trade occurs because one party knows more than the other. The fund manager who has spent three months studying a company knows more than the retiree who sells him the shares, and nobody proposes to imprison the fund manager. So the law against insider trading cannot rest on the principle that it is wrong to trade with someone who knows less than you do. If that were the rule, most of finance would be a crime.
We usually say that the insider has an unfair advantage. But nearly every advantage in a market is an advantage in information. What separates the board director from the analyst is the source of the knowledge. The analyst worked hard for his proprietary information, while the director received hers in confidence from a company that trusted her to use it for the company’s purposes.
I accept that this is a moral wrong, but should it be a crime? It is a breach of trust against the owner of the information, which is the same kind of offense that an employee commits when he takes a customer list to a competitor. We deal with that employee by suing him, dismissing him, and making him give back what he gained. We do not usually threaten him with twenty-one years in prison.1
Who is the victim in insider trading? I find it surprisingly difficult to identify one. On an organized exchange, there is no victim, which makes insider trading a “victimless crime.” The seller on the other side had already decided to sell that day at the prevailing price, and if the insider had placed no order, the seller would have sold to someone else on the same terms. The insider’s order did not cause the sale. If it had any effect, it moved the price slightly toward what the shares were really worth, which helped everyone who sold afterward.
The usual reply is that the victim is the market as a whole. But even this argument already concedes that no particular person was robbed, and merely that a general condition has been degraded.
Anyone who buys shares knows that some participants in the market know more than he does. Dealers understand this best, and they protect themselves by widening the gap between the price at which they buy and the price at which they sell. Ordinary investors do the same thing more roughly, by paying less for shares in markets where they suspect insiders are active. The risk of meeting a better informed counterparty is already in the price before the trade takes place.
Suppose a buyer learns that the government plans to build a road past a farm, and he buys the farm from an owner who has not heard the news. Most legal systems let that sale stand. Commodity traders have long dealt on what they privately know about harvests and shipments. Why should securities be the exception?
Henry Manne made roughly this argument in 1966, and for years most law professors dismissed it.2 He added a point that I find the most interesting part of the debate. Share prices perform an allocative function, so price accuracy is a public good that benefits even investors who never trade. An insider who buys is in effect signaling the information to the market and accelerating price discovery.
Imprisonment is the most severe sanction a state can impose, and it seems unreasonable in our modern times to imprison people for “victimless crimes.”